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Simultaneous Wireless Information Power Transfer
for MISO Secrecy Channel
Zheng Chu, Martin Johnston, and Ste´phane Le Goff
Abstract—This paper investigates simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and power transfer (SWIPT) for multiuser multiple-
input-single-output (MISO) secrecy channel. First, transmit
beamfoming without artificial noise (AN) design is considered,
where two secrecy rate optimization frameworks (i.e., secrecy
rate maximization and harvested energy maximization) are in-
vestigated. These two optimization problems are not convex, and
cannot be solved directly. For secrecy rate maximization problem,
we employ bisection method to optimize the associated power
minimization problem, and first-order Taylor series expansion is
consider to approximate the energy harvesting (EH) constraint
and the harvested energy maximization problem. Moreover, we
extend our proposed algorithm to the associated robust schemes
by incorporating with channel uncertainties, where two-level
method is proposed for the harvested energy maximization
problem. Then, transmit beamforming with AN design is studied
for the same secrecy rate maximization problem, which are
reformulated into semidefinite programming (SDP) based on one-
dimensional search and successive convex approximation (SCA),
respectively. Moreover, tightness analysis of rank relaxation is
provided to show the optimal transmit covariance matrix exactly
returns rank-one. Simulation results is provided to validate the
performance of the proposed algorithm.
Index Terms—MISO system, SWIPT, physical-layer secrecy,
bisection method, successive convex approximation (SCA).
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the main techniques in fifth-generation (5G)
wireless networks, energy harvesting is a technique to extract
energy from the external natural environment (i.e., solar power,
wind energy, etc.), which can be applied to circumvent energy-
limited issue and improve the energy efficiency of wireless
networks [1], [2]. However, traditional energy harvesting tech-
niques are dependent on external sources, which are not part
of the communication network. Since it is not always possible
that the nature environment can provide a stable energy to the
wireless devices, the energy can be alternatively provided by
wireless devices, since radio frequency (RF) signals can carry
energy that is used as a vehicle for transporting information
[3]. In particular, the transmitter in a communication network
not only can transmit the signal, but also transfer the power
to the receivers who are employed to harvest energy to charge
for their devices. Wireless power transfer has been a promis-
ing paradigm to provide power supplies for communication
devices to mitigate the energy scarcity and extend the lifetime
of wireless networks [4], [5].
Secrecy performance played more and more important role
in wireless networks, and there is an increasing number of
interests focusing on physical-layer security. Unlike traditional
cryptographic methods, which is employed to improve secrecy
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performance in the network layer, physical-layer security was
developed in terms of information-theoretical aspects improve
the security of wireless transmission [6]–[8]. Multiple an-
tenna wiretap channel has been widely considered with the
advantage of having extra degrees of freedom and diversity
gains [9]. In addition, some state-of-art techniques have been
developed for multiple-antenna transceivers, which aims to
introduce more interference to eavesdroppers, including coop-
erative beamforming (CB), cooperative jammer (CJ), artificial
noise (AN), energy harvesting beamforming (EHB), device-
to-device transmission (D2D), etc [7], [10]–[19]. The convex
optimization techniques have been employed to solve the
secrecy rate optimization problem (i.e., power minimization
and secrecy rate maximization) based on perfect and imper-
fect channel state information (CSI) [10]. The cooperative
beamforming is employed that requires the relays to forward
the signal from the source to the legitimate user based on
the assumption that the direct transmission is not available.
The optimal power allocation for single-relay multicarrier case
based on decode-and-forward (DF) has been proposed to maxi-
mize the sum secrecy rate [11], whereas in [12] the relay works
in amplify-and-forward (AF) scheme for MIMO system, where
the source and relay beamforming is jointly designed to max-
imize the secrecy rate in the cooperative scheme. Cooperative
jamming is applied in improving physical layer security [13]–
[15]. For single-antenna case, the secrecy rate is maximized
by employing one-dimensional search algorithm [13]. In [15],
Taylor series expansion is investigated to approximate the
secrecy rate optimization for MIMO channel with cooperative
jammer, which can be reformulate the non-convex secrecy
rate optimization framework to convex form, in addition,
game theory technique (i.e., Stackelberg game) is applied for
improving secrecy rate, and Stackelberg game equilibrium
can be derived in terms of closed-form solutions. For MIMO
relay networks, the optimal power allocation is derived for
the generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based
secure relaying schemes [14]. Joint optimization of transmit
beamforming with artificial noise (AN) is proposed in [16],
whereas the energy harvesting beamforming (EHB) and D2D
transmission are not only improve the secrecy rate, but also
can harvest the energy to prolong the lifetime of the devices
by recharging the batteries and enhancing D2D transmission
rate, respectively [17]–[19].
More and more recent attentions are focusing on the com-
bination of transmit beamforing with AN, where AN can be
employed to mask the transmit beamforming so that improve
the secrecy rate, in addition, the transmit beamforming and
AN can be harvested by the energy harvesting (EH) receivers
to improve energy harvesting performance [17], [18], [20].
Moreover, the eavesdroppers in these two literatures play the
two roles: a) passive eavesdropping, b) energy harvesting.
The secrecy rate maximization problem are formulated into
semidefinite programming (SDP) and provide the proof of the
rank-one for the transmit covariance matrix. Robust secure
transmission for MISO Simultaneous Wireless Information
and Power Transfer (SWIPT) system are proposed without
AN [21] and with AN [22], respectively by incorporating
with channel uncertainties, where the proofs of the rank-two
solution for the transmit covariance matrix have been provided.
Motivated by the existing literatures [21], [22], this paper
considers SWIPT for MISO secrecy system with multiple
eavesdroppers and multiple EH receivers, here the secure
transmit beamforming without AN and with AN are designed.
The contribution of this paper is that we address the following
problems:
1) Secrecy rate optimization without AN: We formulate
the secrecy rate optimization framework to design the
transmit beamforming without AN. Two optimization
problems (i.e., secrecy rate maximization and harvested
energy maximization) are consider, which are not convex
and cannot be solved directly. In order to circumvent
this non-convexity issue, we propose a novel refor-
mulation for the secrecy rate maximization problem
based on bisection method, and the harvested energy
maximization problem via first-order Taylor series based
one-dimensional line search algorithm, respectively. In
addition, these associated robust schemes are solved
by incorporating with channel uncertainties. Unlike the
most existing literature, which employs semidefinite
relaxation (SDR) (or rank-relaxation) to design the trans-
mit beamforming, in this paper, we consider the relax-
ation to circumvent the rank-relaxation and we show
our proposed schemes can achieve the same secrecy
performance with that via SDR.
2) Secrecy rate optimization with AN: Secrecy rate max-
imization problem is formulated to jointly optimiza-
tion for transmit beamforming with AN. In this paper,
we propose two reformulations for this optimization
framework based on one-dimensional line search and
SCA algorithms, respectively, which can be used to
reformulate the problem to semidefinite programming
(SDP). In addition, we provide the tightness analysis for
the rank-relaxation, which shows the optimal solution of
the secrecy rate maximization exactly returns rank-one.
Moreover, we extend our proposed schemes to the asso-
ciated case by incorporating with channel uncertainties
and the case with multiantenna eavesdroppers and EH
receivers.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. A
system model is described in Section II. The secrecy rate opti-
mization problems with SWIPT are solved to jointly optimize
the transmit beaforming without AN based on perfect and
imperfect CSI in Section III and IV. Secrecy rate optimization
problem with SWIPT to joint optimization of the transmit
beaforming with AN is investigated in Section V. Section
VI provides the simulation results to support the proposed
schemes. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section VII.
A. Notation
We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and
lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H
denote the transpose, conjugate and conjugate transpose re-
spectively. Tr(·) and E{·} stand for trace of a matrix and
the statistical expectation for random variables. Vec(A) is the
vector obtained by stacking the columns of A on top of one
another and ⊗ is the Kronecker product. A  0 indicates
that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. I and (·)−1 denote
the identity matrix with appropriate size and the inverse of a
matrix respectively. ‖ · ‖2 represents the Euclidean norm of
a matrix. ℜ{·} stands for the real part of a complex number,
whereas |A| denotes the determinant of A. [x]+ represents
max{x, 0}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO secured SWIPT channel, where it con-
sists of one multiantenna legitimate transmitter, one legitimate
user, K eavesdroppers and L energy harvesting (EH) receiver.
It is assumed that the transmitter is equipped with NT transmit
antennas, whereas the legitimate user, the eavesdroppers and
the EH receivers each have a single receive antenna. The
channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter and the
legitimate user, the k-th eavesdropper as well as the l-th EH
receiver are denoted by hs ∈ CNT×1, he,k ∈ CNT×1, and
hp,l ∈ CNT×1, respectively. The noise power at the legitimate
user and the eavesdroppers are assumed to be σ2s and σ2e . The
received signal at the legitimate user and the k-th eavesdropper
can be written as
ys = h
H
s ws+ns,
ye,k = h
H
e,kws+ne,k, k = 1, ..., K,
where s(E{s2} = 1) and w ∈ CNT×1 are the desired signal
for the legitimate user and the beamforming at the legitimate
transmitter, respectively. In addition, ns ∼ CN (0, σ2s) and
ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2e) represent the noise of the legitimate user
and the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. Thus, the achieved
secrecy rate at the legitimate user is expressed as follows:
Rs=
[
log
(
1+
|hHs w|2
σ2s
)
−max
k
log
(
1+
|hHe,kw|2
σ2e
)]+
, ∀k.
(1)
The harvested energy at the l-the EH receiver is written as
El = |hHl w|2, ∀l. (2)
Remark: This system model is considered to consists of L EH
receivers, which harvest a number amount of power carried
by RF signal without AN or with AN based on a reliable
transmission scenario. These EH receivers sometimes play a “
helper ” role by employing the harvested power to introduce a
jamming signal to confuse the eavesdroppers [23]. However,
the efficiency of this harvest-and-jamming policy is dependant
on the network topology [24]. In this paper, we mainly focus
on the secrecy rate optimization without AN or with AN,
based on this reliable communication, the performance the EH
receiver harvest the power is exploited, whereas how to use
the harvested power is beyond our paper.
TABLE I: Bisection methods
1) Given lower and upper bound of the targeted secrecy rate Rmin and
Rmax, and a desired solution accuracy τ (very small value).
2) Setting R = (Rmin +Rmax)/2.
3) Iteration loop begin
a) Solve the corresponding power minimization problem in (5)
using the relaxation method to obtain the beamforming w.
b) Computing the transmit power P˜ = ‖w‖2.
c) If P˜ ≤ P , then Rmin = R; otherwise, Rmax = R.
d) Until Rmax − Rmin ≤ τ , break.
4) Iteration loop end
5) R is the achieved secrecy rate of the secrecy rate maximization
problem, and w is the corresponding optimal solution.
III. SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATION WITHOUT AN
In this section, we consider the MISO secrecy with multiple
eavesdroppers and EH receivers shown in Section II, where
the secure beamforming is designed without AN, in addition,
the secrecy rate optimization frameworks (i.e., secrecy rate
maximization and harvested energy maximization) are refor-
mulated as a novel SDP form to circumvent rank relaxation.
Thus, these optimization problems are formulated as follows:
• Secrecy rate maximization: The secrecy rate is maximized
subject to transmit power and minimum harvested energy
constraints.
max
w
min
k
Rs, s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ P, min
l
El ≥ E, ∀k, l, (3)
where P is the maximum available transmit power at
the legitimate transmitter, E denotes the target harvested
energy of the EH receivers.
• Harvested energy maximization: The harvested energy is
maximized with the constraints of the secrecy rate and
transmit power.
max
w
min
l
El, s.t. min
k
Rs,k ≥ R, ‖w‖2 ≤ P, ∀k, l, (4)
where R is the predefined secrecy rate of the legitimate
user.
These above problems are not convex, and cannot be solved
directly. Unlike existing literature [21], where rank relaxation
is consider to reformulate the secrecy rate, however, since it
is challenging to show rank-one solution, the authors provided
suboptimal solution for the secrecy rate maximization. In this
paper, we propose a novel relax method for secrecy rate
constraint to circumvent rank relaxation.
A. Secrecy Rate Maximization
In this subsection, we consider the relax of the secrecy rate
maximization problem (3), which is not convex due to the se-
crecy rate and non-convex EH constraint, and cannot be solved
directly. In order to circumvent these two issues, we convert
this problem into a sequence of the power minimization
problems, one for each target rate R > 0. The optimal solution
of the secrecy rate maximization problem can be obtained by
solving the corresponding power minimization problem with
different R, which can be obtained by using bisection search
over R. Thus, the bisection method can be summarized in
Table I to solve this secrecy rate maximization problem. In the
following, we will focus on the power minimization problem
written as follows:
min
w
‖w‖2,
s.t. min
k
Rs ≥ R, min
l
El ≥ E, ∀k, l. (5)
Now, we consider the power minimization problem based
on the assumption that the transmitter has perfect CSI of the
legitimate user, the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers. Thus,
the problem in (5) can be relaxed as
min
w
‖w‖2,
s.t. log
(
1+
|hHs w|2
σ2s
)
−log
(
1+
|hHe,kw|2
σ2e
)
≥R, ∀k,
|hHl w|2≥E, ∀l. (6)
The above problem is not convex in terms of w and the
non-convex EH constraint. In order to circumvent these issues,
we convert the secrecy rate constraint into SDP form and
reformulate the EH constraint based on successive convex
approximation (SCA), respectively. Thus, the following
lemma is required to tackle the power minimization problem
(6):
Lemma 1: The problem in (6) is reformulated into the
following form:
min
w
s1,
s.t.
[
s1
w
]
K 0,
Sk=


1
σs
wHhsI
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
1
σs
wHhs

  0, ∀k,
xl = ℜ{wHhl}, yl = ℑ{wHhl}, ul = [xl yl],
‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)] ≥ E, ∀l. (7)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
In problem (7), the secrecy rate constraint is reformulated
into SDP form, whereas the EH constraint is approximated
by first-order Taylor series expansion. An initialization value
of the vector ul is given by random generation, and ul can be
updated at each iteration, and u(n+1)l = u
(n)
l holds when the
algorithm converges, in addition, it is guaranteed to converge
to a locally optimal solution (quite close to the globally
optimal solution) [25], [26].
B. Harvested Energy Maximization
Now, we turn our attention to harvested energy maximiza-
tion problem (4), which can be relaxed as
max
w,t
t
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ P,
min
l
|wHhl|2 ≥ t, ∀l, (8a)
Sk  0, ∀k, (8b)
where t is a slack variable for the minimum EH constraint, Sk
has been defined in (7). Although the secrecy rate constraint
(9a) is LMI, the above problem is still not convex in terms
of the harvested energy constraint (9b). The approximation
is similar to Lemma 1 in Section III-A, in which the energy
maximization problem can be reformulated as
max
w,t
t
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ P,
Sk  0, ∀k, (9a)
‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)] ≥ t, ∀l, (9b)
where ul has been defined in Lemma 1. The above problem
is convex for u(n)l at each iteration, and can be solved by
interior-point method.
IV. ROBUST SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATION WITH
CHANNEL UNCERTAINTY
In the previous section, we have solve the secrecy rate opti-
mization problem based on the assumption that the transmitter
has perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers. However, it is not always
possible to have perfect CSI due to lack of cooperation as
well as channel estimation and quantization error. Thus, we
consider robust scheme based on the worst-case secrecy rate
by incorporating channel uncertainties.
A. Channel Uncertainty
In this subsection, it is assumed that the channel state
information is not available at the legitimate transmitter. The
channel uncertainties based on worst-case scheme is modelled
as
hs = h¯s+es,
he,k = h¯e,k+ee,k,
hl = h¯l+el,
where h¯s, h¯e,k and h¯l denote the estimated channels of the
legitimate user, the k-th eavesdropper and the l-th EH receiver,
and es, ee,k and el represent the corresponding channel errors,
which are assumed to be bounded as
‖es‖2 = ‖hs−h¯s‖2≤εs, for εk ≥ 0,
‖ee,k‖2 = ‖he,k−h¯e,k‖2≤εk, for εk ≥ 0,
‖el‖2 = ‖hl−h¯l‖2≤εl, for εl ≥ 0.
In the following subsections, we will reformulate the secrecy
rate optimization frameworks based on this channel uncertain-
ties.
B. Robust Secrecy Rate Optimization with Channel Uncer-
tainty
Now, we solve the robust power minimization problem by
incorporating with channel uncertainties, where the CSI of the
legitimate user, the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers are not
available at the legitimate transmitter. Thus, the relaxed robust
problem is formulated as follows:
min
w
‖w‖2,
s.t. min
es
log
(
1+
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
)
−
max
ee,k
log
(
1+
|(h¯e,k + ee,k)Hw|2
σ2e
)
≥R, ∀k, (10a)
|(h¯l + el)Hw|2≥E, ∀l. (10b)
The problem (10) is not convex in terms of channel uncer-
tainties, and cannot be solved directly, thus, we first consider
the reformulation of the secrecy rate constraint (10a), which
can be relaxed as

1
σs
(
wH h¯s−εs‖w‖
)
≥ √t2,
[
2
R
2
σe
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
Hw (2R−1) 12
][ 2R2
σe
wH(h¯e,k+ee,k)
(2R−1) 12
]
≤ t2,
(11)
The first constraint in (11) is rewritten based on first-order
Taylor approximation as follows:
1
σs
ℜ{wH h¯s}− εs
σs
‖w‖ ≥ f (n)(t2), (12)
where f (n)(t2) =
√
t
(n)
2 +
1
2
√
t
(n)
2
(t2 − t
(n)
2 ).
Lemma 2: The second constraint in (11) can be reformu-
lated as
S¯k=


Sk,1−λk
[
0 −1 ] [ 0−1
]
−εe,k

 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0


−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
λkI

0,∀k.
(13)
where
Sk,1 =


f (n)(t2)I
[
2
R
2
σe
wHh¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
f (n)(t2)

 . (14)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Thus, the robust power minimization problem can be written
as
min
s2,w,λk
s2,
s.t.
[
s2
w
]
K 0,
S¯k(λk, f
(n)(t2))  0,
1
σs
w
H
h¯s− εs
σs
‖w‖ ≥ f (n)(t2), ∀k,
ℜ{h¯Hl w} ≥ E
1
2 + εl‖w‖2, ℑ{h¯Hl w} = 0, ∀l. (15)
The above problem is convex for a given t(n)2 at each iteration.
Thus, an initialization of t2 is given to solve the problem (15)
by using interior-point method, which is updated iteratively. It
is easily observed that t2 is updated to t(n+1)2 = tn2 when the
algorithm converges.
C. Robust Harvested Energy Maximization with Channel Un-
certainty
Now, we turn our attention to robust harvested energy
maximization framework, where we consider maximizing the
harvested energy subject to the achieved secrecy rate and the
transmit power constraints incorporating channel uncertainties.
This optimization framework is formulated as
max
w
min
el
|(h¯l + el)Hw|2,
s.t. min
es
log
(
1+
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
)
−max
ee,k
log
(
1+
|(h¯e,k+ee,k)Hw|2
σ2e
)
≥R, ∀k,(16a)
‖w‖2 ≤ P, ∀l. (16b)
The above problem is not convex in terms of channel
uncertainties and nonconvexity of the secrecy rate constraint,
and cannot be solved directly. Based on the equivalent refor-
mulations, we propose a two-level SCA based optimization
algorithm to obtain the robust energy maximization problem
(16). We denote w∗ as the optimal solution to the problem
(16), and define |(h¯s+es)Hw∗|2
σ2s
= τ∗, then w is also optimal
solution of the following problem with τ = τ∗. By employing
a slack variable τ , we have
max
w
min
el
|(h¯l + el)Hw|2,
s.t. 2R
|(h¯e,k + ee,k)Hw|2
σ2e
+ (2R − 1) ≤ τ, ∀k, (17a)
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
≥τ, (17b)
‖w‖2 ≤ P, (17c)
The proof for statement is easy and the details are omitted
for brevity. Then, we consider to denote the optimal value of
the problem (24) as f(τ), which is a function of τ , then the
following theorem holds,
Theorem 1: The problem (16) is equivalent to the following
problem:
max
τ≥0
f(τ ) (18)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Based on Theorem 1, the problem (18) can be solved instead
of solving (16). Thus, we propose a two-level optimization
algorithm to obtain the optimal value of τ . In this following,
we focus on reformulation of the problem (17) based on a
given τ , which can rewritten by employing a slack variable
for the objective function of (17) as follows:
max
w,t3
t3,
s.t. |(h¯l + el)Hw|2 ≥ t3, ∀l,
2R
|(h¯e,k + ee,k)Hw|2
σ2e
+ (2R − 1) ≤ τ, ∀k,
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
≥ τ, ∀k,
‖w‖2 ≤ P, (19)
Energy constraint can be approximated based on SCA as
ℜ{wH h¯l} − el‖w‖2 ≥
√
t
(n)
3 +
1
2
√
t
(n)
3
(t3 − t(n)3 ),∀l. (20)
The secrecy rate constraint can be reformulated as∥∥∥∥∥
[
2
R
2
σe
wH(h¯e,k + ee,k)
(2R − 1) 12
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤√τ, ∀k, (21a)
1
σs
(ℜ{wH h¯s} − εs‖w‖) ≥
√
τ . (21b)
From Nemirovski lemma shown in Appendix B, the con-
straint (21a) can be written as
A¯k=


Ak−µk
[
0 −1 ] [ 0−1
]
−εe,k

 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0


−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
µkI

  0, (22)
where
Ak =


√
τI
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wHh¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
√
τ

 (23)
Thus, the robust harvested energy maximization problem is
equivalently reformulated as
max
w,t3
t3
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ P,
(20), (22), (21b). (24)
The problem (24) is convex for a given τ and a initialized
value of t(n)3 , the SCA algorithm also can be employed to
approximate t(n)3 for (21b), whereas we propose a straightfor-
ward line based search algorithm to obtain optimal τ . In order
to carry out this algorithm, we will determine the iterative
and feasible region of τ (i.e., τmin ≤ τ ≤ τmax), where
the optimal value of τ∗ is inside this region. According to
the problem (18), we can easily determine the lower bound
of τmin = 0. Then, we will show the upper bound τmax by
using inequality properties:
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
≤ ‖w‖
2
σ2s
‖h¯s + es‖2
≤ P
σ2s
(‖h¯s‖2 + ‖es‖2)2
≤ P
σ2s
(‖h¯s‖2 + εs)2. (25)
The upper bound in (25) can be derived based on Cauchy-
schwarz and triangle inequalities, as well as ‖w‖2 ≤ P and
‖es‖ ≤ εs. Hence, the iterative region can be obtain as
0 ≤ τ ≤ P
σ2s
(‖h¯s‖2 + εs)2. From the reformulation for the
original problem (16) and iterative region, we summarize one-
dimensional search algorithm as Table II.
V. SECURE SWIPT OF JOINT BEAMFORMING AND
ARTIFICIAL NOISE DESIGN
In the previous section, we solved the secrecy rate optimiza-
tion problems to optimize the transmit beamforming without
AN, where the proposed algorithms are implemented without
rank-relaxation at the expense of high computational complex-
ity. In this section, we extend our attention to joint signal
beamforming and artificial noise (AN) design in secrecy rate
optimization problem, where the legitimate transmitter sends
the signal with AN in order to introduce more interferences
to the eavesdroppers. In addition, AN can be harvested with
signal beamforming by the EH receivers, which improves
the performance of SWIPT. The secrecy rate optimization
problem can be formulated into SDP. Unlike [22], where it
TABLE II: One-Dimensional Search for (24)
1) Given τmax, ∆τ , and an initialization value of t(n)3 = t
(0)
3 .
2) Outer Iteration loop begin
If τ ≤ τmax, then
a) Inner Iteration loop begin
If the problem (24) is feasible, then
i) Solving (24) based on SCA algorithm for a initialization tn3
based on a given τ .
ii) Set t3 = t(n)3 .
else
Break
end
b) Inner Iteration loop end until the SCA algorithm converges.
c) Updating τ = τ +∆τ .
end
3) Iteration loop end until the required accuracy.
4) Obtain τ∗ by solving a sequence of problems (18) for a given τ , and
the optimal transmit beamforming w∗ can be obtained.
has shown that the rank of the optimal solution obtained from
line search algorithm was less than or equal to 2. In this
paper, we provide a novel SDP relaxation for the secrecy rate
optimization problem, and exactly show the optimal solution
always returns rank-one.
A. Problem Formulation
We first write the secrecy rate maximization problem with
the transmit power and the minimum EH constraints, where the
secured transmit beamforming and AN are jointly designed.
This optimization problem can be formulated as
max
Q,W
min
k
Rs−Re,k, ∀k,
s.t. Tr(Qs +W) ≤ P, [Qs +W](i,i) ≤ pi, ∀i,
min
l
h
H
l (Qs +W)hl ≥ El, ∀l. (26)
where Qs = E{wwH} is transmit covariance matrix, W =
E{vvH} is AN beamforming, [Qs +W](i,i) (i = 1, ..., NT )
represents each antenna transmit power constraint, and the mu-
tual information at the legitimate user and k-th eavesdropper
can be written as
Rs = log
(
1 +
hHs Qsh
H
s
hHs Wh
H
s + σ2s
)
,
Re,k = log
(
1 +
hHe,kQsh
H
e,k
hHe,kWh
H
e,k + σ
2
e
)
.
Remark 1: The relaxation method to be proposed is also
suitable for the scenario that the eavesdroppers and the EH
receivers are equipped with multiple antennas. We will provide
the analysis in Section V-D.
B. Secrecy Rate Optimization
For the secrecy rate maximization problem (26), we will
provide two different methods to joint optimize transmit
covariance matrix and AN beamforming: 1) SDP-based one-
dimensional line search, 2) SDP based on SCA.
1) SDP-Based One-Dimensional Line Search Method: We
first introduce a slack variable t, and the problem (26) is
rewritten as
max
Qs,W,t
Rs + log(t),
s.t. log
(
1 +
hHe,kQsh
H
e,k
hHe,kWh
H
e,k + σ
2
e
)
≤ log(1
t
), ∀k, (27a)
Tr(Qs +W) ≤ P, Tr[Ai(Qs +W)] ≤ pi, ∀i,(27b)
h
H
l (Qs +W)hl ≥ El, ∀l, (27c)
Qs  0,W  0, t ≥ 0,
where Ai = aiaHi is given antenna design parameters to
adjust each antenna power budget, and ai is unit i-th vector
(i.e., [ai]j = 1 for i = j and [ai]j = 0 for i 6= j). The specific
applications of per-antenna power constraint have been already
described in [16], [18]. The problem (27) is still not convex
in terms of the constraint (27a), and cannot be solved directly,
thus, it can be formulated as a two-stage optimization problem,
the outer problem is a function of t, which can be written as
max
t
log(1 + f(t)) + log(t),
s.t. tmin ≤ t ≤ 1, (28)
The lower bound tmin can be derived as follows:
t ≥
(
1 +
hHs Qsh
H
s
hHs Wh
H
s + σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
hHs Qsh
H
s
σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
λmax(Qs)‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
Tr(Qs)‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
P‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1
= tmin. (29)
Then, the inner problem can recast for a given t as follows:
f(t) = max
Qs,W,t
hHs Qsh
H
s
hHs Wh
H
s + σ2s
,
s.t. (27a)− (27c). (30)
It easily verified that the constraint (27) can be reformulated
as
h
H
e,k
[
Qs−(1
t
−1)W
]
he,k≤ (1
t
−1)σ2e , (31)
Thus the problem can recast for a given t as follows:
f(t) = max
Qs,W,t
hHs Qsh
H
s
hHs Wh
H
s + σ2s
,
s.t. (31), (27b), (27c). (32)
The problem (32) is a quasi-convex problem, thus we consider
Charnes-Cooper transformation to convert it into a convex
problem. Let us introduce δ so that the following relations
hold:
Qs =
Q¯s
δ
, W =
W¯
δ
(33)
Thus, we have
f(t)= max
Q¯s,W¯
h
H
s Q¯shs,
s.t. h
H
s W¯hs + δσ
2
b = 1,
h
H
e,k
[
Q¯s−(1
t
−1)W¯
]
he,k≤ (1
t
−1)δσ2e ,
Tr(Q¯s + W¯) ≤ δP, Tr[Ai(Q¯s + W¯)] ≤ δpi, ∀i,
h
H
l (Q¯s + W¯)hl ≥ δEl, ∀l, Q¯s  0, W¯  0. (34)
The problem (34) is a convex problem, and can be solved
efficiently by using interior-point method [27]. Thus, the
optimal solution of the problem (32) can be obtained through
(33), once the problem (34) has been solved.
2) Tightness Analyses of Rank Relaxation: Now we inves-
tigate the tightness of the rank relaxation to the problem (32),
we assume that the optimal value f(t) can be obtained by the
optimal solution of the problem (32), we have the following
inequality,
hHs Qshs
hHs Whs+σ2s
≥f(t)⇒hHs [Qs−f(t)W]hs≥f(t)σ2s , (35)
Thus, we consider the following power minimization,
min
Qs
Tr(Qs)
s.t. (35), (27b), (27c). (36)
It is easily verified that the feasible solution of problem (36)
is the optimal of (32) due to the constraints (35), (27b), (27c).
Thus, the following theorem is provided to show every optimal
solution of the problem (36) is rank-one:
Theorem 2: If the problem (32) is feasible, then there al-
ways exists optimal solution (i.e., Qs) satisfies rank(Qs) ≤ 1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
From Theorem 2, tightness analysis has been provided so that
the problem (32) has a rank-one solution for all feasible t.
3) SDP Based Successive Convex Approximation: In this
section, we propose a SDP based successive linear approx-
imation (SCA) algorithm to joint optimization for transmit
beamforming and AN, thus, rewrite the problem (26) as
min
Qs,W
max
k
(
σ2e+Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs+W)]
)(
σ2s+Tr(hshHs W)
)
(
σ2s+Tr[hshHs (Qs+W)]
)(
σ2e+Tr(he,khHe,kW)
)
s.t. Tr(Qs +W) ≤ P, Tr[Ai(Qs +W)] ≤ pi, ∀i, (37a)
h
H
l (Qs +W)hl ≥ El, ∀l. (37b)
The above problem is not convex in terms of the objective
function. Let us introduce the following exponential variables
to equivalently modified the objective function.
e
x0 =σ2s+Tr[hshHs (Qs+W)], exk =σ2e+Tr(he,khHe,kW),
e
yk =σ2e+Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs+W)], ey0 =σ2s+Tr(hshHs W).
(38)
Thus, the problem (37) is rewritten by introducing a slack
variable τ as
min
Qs,W,x0,y0,xk,yk
τ (39a)
s.t. e
y0−x0+yk−xk≤τ, (39b)
σ
2
s+Tr[hshHs (Qs+W)]≥ex0 , σ2e+Tr(he,khHe,kW) ≥ exk ,
(39c)
σ
2
e+Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs+W)]≤eyk , σ2s+Tr(hshHs W)≤ey0 ,
(39d)
(37a), (37b). (39e)
The above problem is not still convex in terms the constraint
(39d). Thus, Taylor series expansion (i.e., axˆ+axˆ ln a(x−xˆ) ≤
ax) is employed to linearise (39d) as follows:
σ
2
e+Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs+W)] ≤ eyˆk(yk−yˆk+1), (40a)
σ
2
s+Tr(hshHs W)≤eyˆ0(y0−yˆ0+1), (40b)
TABLE III: SCA algorithm for the robust secrecy rate
maximization problem (39).
1) Initialize (Qs[0],W[0]) so that (39) is feasible, and given κ as the
tolerance factor for stopping criterion.
2) Iteration loop begin:
a) Updating (x0[n], xk[n], y0[n], yk[n]) by (38).
b) Solving (41) with (x0[n], xk[k], y0[n], yk[n]) to obtain
(Qs[n],W[n]).
3) Iteration loop end until stopping criterion |τ(n+ 1)− τ(n)| ≤ κ.
Thus, the secrecy rate maximization problem can be relaxed
as
min
Qs,W,x0,y0,xk,yk,τ
τ
s.t. (37a), (37b), (39b), (39c), (40), ∀k. (41)
From SCA, the approximation with current optimal so-
lution can be updated iteratively until the constraints (39c)
and (39d) hold with equality, which implies the problem
(37) is optimally solved. This SCA algorithm is outlined
as Table III . The optimal solution obtained by the SDP
based SCA algorithm at n-the iteration is assumed to
be (Q∗s(n),W∗(n), x∗0(n), y∗0(n), x∗k(n), y∗k(n), τ∗(n)), which
can achieve a stable point when the SDP based SCA algo-
rithm converges, the proof has been shown in [28]. Now, we
consider the tightness analysis for the problem (39) due to
rank relaxation. It is assumed that (Q∗s,W∗) are the optimal
solution of the problem (37) that are obtained by solving the
problem (41) with the SDP based SCA algorithm, and the
corresponding slack variables (i.e., x∗0, y∗0 , x∗k, y∗k, τ∗) can be
obtained by (38) and (39b), respectively. Thus, we consider
the following problem:
min
Qs,W
Tr(Qs)
s.t. (37a), (37b),
σ
2
s+Tr[hshHs (Qs+W)]≥ex
∗
0 , σ
2
e+Tr(he,khHe,kW)≥ex
∗
k ,
σ
2
e+Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs+W)]≤ey
∗
k , σ
2
s+Tr(hshHs W)≤ey
∗
0 , ∀k.
(42)
We also assume that the optimal solutions of the above
problem can be denoted as (Qˆs,Wˆ), which are the feasible
solution of the problem (37). Hence, the objective value τˆ
is obtained by substituting (Qˆs,Wˆ) into (37), and we have
τˆ ≤ τ∗, which implies (Qˆs,Wˆ) is at least the same optimal
solution to (Q∗s,W∗) for (37). Thus, provided the problem
(37) is feasible for positive secrecy rate, there always exists
the optimal solution is rank-one, the proof is similar to that
of Theorem 2.
C. Robust Secrecy Rate Optimization
In the previous section, we have solved secrecy rate max-
imization problem based on the assumption that the legit-
imate transmitter has perfect CSI of the legitimate user,
the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers. However, it is not
always possible to have perfect CSI at the transmitter due to
quantization errors and channel estimation. Therefore, robust
secrecy rate optimization is employed to jointly optimize
the transmit beamforming and AN by incorporating channel
uncertainties, which have been shown in Section IV-A. In
addition, robust power constraint per antenna is considered,
where the Hermitian positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix Ai is
not available at the legitimate transmitter, thus the true PSD
matrix can be written as
Ai = A¯i +∆i, ‖∆i‖F ≤ εi, ∀i, (43)
where A¯i ∈ HNT+ is the estimated Hermitian PSD ma-
trix, ∆i is estimated error of the matrix A¯i, which can be
modelled as a spherical uncertainty with a norm-bound εi.
In the following, we consider one dimensional search and
successive convex optimization methods to solve the robust
secrecy rate maximization problem by incorporating with the
channel uncertainties.
1) Robust SDP Based One Dimension Search: In this sub-
section, robust SDP based one-dimensional search algorithm
is proposed to jointly optimize transmit beamforming and
AN by incorporating with channel uncertainties. Thus, the
two-level optimization framework have been discussed in the
previous subsection is employed by incorporating with channel
uncertainties. Since the outer problem does not involve the
channel uncertainties that is similar to Section V-B1, thus
we focus on the inner problem for a given t, which can be
reformulated as
f(t)= max
Qs,W,t
(h¯s+es)
HQs(h¯s+es)
(h¯s+es)HW(h¯s+es)+σ2s
,
s.t. (h¯e,k+ee,k)
H
[
Qs−
(
1
t
−1
)
W
]
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
≤ (1
t
−1)σ2e ,
Tr(Qs +W)≤P, max
∆i
Tr[(A¯i+∆i)(Qs+W)]≤pi,
(h¯l+el)
H(Qs+W)(h¯l+el)≥El, ∀l,Qs0,W0, t≥0.
(44)
The above problem is not convex due to channel uncertainties.
Thus, we consider S-Procedure to solve this robust secrecy rate
maximization problem, which can be written as
f(t)= max
Qs,W,t,λe,k,αl
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HW(h¯s + es) + σ2s
,
s.t. Tr(Qs+W)≤P, Tr[A¯i(Qs+W)]+εi‖Qs+W‖F ≤pi,
∀i, (45a)[
λe,kI−[Qs−( 1t −1)W] −[Qs−( 1t−1)W]h¯e,k
−h¯He,k[Qs−( 1t−1)W] ck
]
0, ∀k,
(45b)[
αlI+(Qs+W) (Qs+W)h¯l
h¯Hl (Qs+W) h¯
H
l (Qs+W)h¯l−El−αlε2l
]
0, ∀l, (45c)
where ck = −h¯He,k[(Qs−1t−1)W]h¯e,k+(
1
t
−1)σ2e−λe,kε
2
e. Let us
introduce a slack variable τ to relax the objective function of
the problem (45), and by exploiting S-Procedure and Charnes-
Cooper transformation, we have
f(t)= max
Q¯s,W¯,λs,µs,λe,k,αl
τ,
s.t.
[
λsI+Q¯s Q¯sh¯s
h¯Hs Q¯s h¯
H
s Q¯sh¯s−τ−λsε2s
]
0,[
µsI−W¯ −W¯h¯s
−h¯Hs W¯ −h¯Hs W¯h¯s−δσ2s+1−µsε2s
]
0,[
λe,kI−[Q¯s−( 1t−1)W¯] −[Q¯s−( 1t−1)W¯]h¯e,k
−h¯He,k[Q¯s−( 1t −1)W¯] c¯k
]
 0,[
αlI+(Q¯s+W¯) (Q¯s+W¯)h¯l
h¯Hl (Q¯s+W¯) h¯
H
l (Q¯s+W¯)h¯l−δEl−αlε2l
]
0,
Tr[A¯i(Q¯s+W¯)]+εi‖Q¯s+W¯‖F ≤δpi,∀i,
Tr(Q¯s + W¯) ≤ δP, (46)
where c¯k = −h¯He,k[Q¯s−(1t−1)W¯]h¯e,k+δ(
1
t
−1)σ2e−λe,kε
2
e.
By solving the problem (46), we can obtain the optimal value
f(t)∗, which can be written based on channel uncertainties as
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HW(h¯s + es) + σ2s
≥ f(t)∗,
⇒ (h¯s + es)H [Qs − f(t)∗W](h¯s + es) ≥ f(t)∗σ2s , (47)
Thus, the associated power minimization problem can be
given as follows:
min
Qs,W,αl,βs,λe,k
Tr(Qs),
s.t. (45a)− (45c), (48a)[
βsI+[Qs−f(t)∗W] [Qs−f(t)∗W]h¯s
h¯Hs [Qs−f(t)∗W] ds
]
 0, (48b)
where ds = h¯Hs [Qs−f(t)∗W]h¯s−f(t)∗σ2s−βsε2s. It easily
verified that the feasible solution to problem (48) is optimal
for (45), which is derived from (48a) and (48b). Thus, the
following theorem holds to show the optimal solution of (45)
is rank-one:
Theorem 3: Provided that the problem (45) is feasible, the
optimal solution of (45) always return rank-one, and this
optimal solution can be obtained by solving (46).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
2) Robust SDP Based Successive Convex Optimization:
Now, we consider the second reformulation for the secrecy
rate maximization problem to joint optimization for transmit
beamforming and AN covariance matrix, the optimization
framework can also be reformulated into robust SDP based
SCA by incorporating with channel uncertainty. Thus, this
robust secrecy rate maximization problem can be rewritten as
min
Qs,W
max
k
te,krs
ts
(49a)
s.t. Tr(Qs+W)≤P, Tr[(A¯i+∆i)(Qs+W)]≤pi, ∀i,
(49b)
h
H
l (Qs +W)hl ≥ El, ∀l. (49c)
where te,k = σ2e+(h¯e,k+ee,k)H(Qs+W)(h¯e,k+ee,k), rs =
σ2s+(h¯s+es)
HW(h¯s+es), ts = σ
2
s+(h¯s+es)
H(Qs+W)(h¯s+es)
and re,k = σ2e+(h¯e,k+ee,k)HW(h¯e,k+ee,k). Let us introduce
the following relations for (49a)
e
x0 ≤ σ2s +min
es
(h¯s + es)
H(Qs +W)(h¯s + es), (50a)
e
xk ≤ σ2e +min
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
H
W(h¯e,k + ee,k), (50b)
e
yk ≥ σ2e +max
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
H(Qs +W)(h¯e,k + ee,k),(50c)
e
y0 ≥ σ2s +max
es
(h¯s + es)
H
W(h¯s + es), (50d)
By employing the slack variables (i.e., τ , us, ue,k, vs, and
ve,k) for (49a), (50a)-(50d), respectively, the problem (49) can
be equivalently modified as
min
Ω
τ,
s.t. e
y0+yk−x0−xk≤τ, ∀k, (49b), (49c),
e
x0≤σ2s+us, min
es
(h¯s+es)
H [Qs+W](h¯s+es)≥us, (51a)
e
xk≤σ2e+ue,k, min
ee,k
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
H
W(h¯e,k+ee,k)≥ue,k, ∀k,
(51b)
e
yk≥σ2e+ve,k, max
ee,k
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
H(Qs+W)(h¯e,k+ee,k)≤ve,k,
(51c)
e
y0≥σ2s+vs, max
es
(h¯s+es)
H
W(h¯s+es)≤vs, (51d)
{Qs,W, es, ee,k, x0, y0, xk, yk, us, ue,k, vs, ve,k} ∈ Ω. (51e)
By exploiting S-Procedure and first-order Taylor series
approximation, we have
min
Ω
τ,
s.t. e
y0+yk−x0−xk≤τ, ex0≤σ2s+us, exk≤σ2e+ue,k, (52a)
e
y¯k(yk−y¯k+1)≥σ2e+ve,k, ey¯0(y0−y¯0+1)≥σ2s+vs, (52b)[
λsI+(Qs+W) (Qs+W)h¯s
h¯Hs (Qs+W) h¯
H
s (Qs+W)h¯s−us−λsε2s
]
0, (52c)[
λe,kI+W Wh¯e,k
h¯He,kW h¯
H
e,kWh¯e,k−ue,k−λe,kε2e,k
]
 0, (52d)[
βe,kI−(Qs +W) −(Qs+W)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(Qs+W) −h¯He,k(Qs+W)h¯e,k+ve,k−βe,kε2e,k
]
0,
(52e)[
βsI−W −Wh¯s
−h¯Hs W −h¯Hs Wh¯s+vs−βsε2s
]
0, (52f)[
αlI+(Qs+W) (Qs+W)h¯l
h¯Hl (Qs+W) h¯
H
l (Qs+W)h¯l−El−αlε2l
]
0, (52g)
Tr(Qs+W)≤P, Tr[A¯i(Qs+W)]+‖Qs+W‖F ≤pi,
[Qs0,W0, x0, y0, xk, yk, us, ue,k, vs, ve,k,
λs ≥ 0, λe,k ≥ 0, βs ≥ 0, βe,k ≥ 0, αl ≥ 0]∈Ω, ∀i, l, k. (52h)
The above problem is convex for a given y¯k and y¯0 at
each iteration, can be solved by using interior-point method to
update the solution for the next iteration until the algorithm
converges. Thus the robust SDP based SCA algorithm is
similar to Table III. On the other hand, the rank-1 solution
can be obtained that is similar to that of one-dimensional line
search algorithm shown in Theorem 3.
D. Extension to The Case of Multiantenna Eavesdroppers and
EH Receivers
Now, we show that the Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 can
also be applied in a more challenging scenario that the
eavesdroppers and EH receiver are equipped with multiple
antennas by the following corollary:
Corollary 1: If the eavesdroppers and EH receivers are
equipped with multiple antennas, the optimal solution of the
problems (32) and (45) still always return rank-one based on
perfect and imperfect CSI.
Proof: We first reconsider the constraints (27a) and (27c)
based on the assumption that the eavesdroppers and EH
receivers are equipped with multiple antennas.
log
∣∣∣∣I+
(
σ
2
eI+H
H
e,kWHe,k
)−1
H
H
e,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣≤ log(t−1), (53a)
Tr
[
H
H
l (Qs+W)Hl
]
≥El, (53b)
where He,k ∈ CNT×NE,k and Hl ∈ CNT×Nl are the channel
matrices between the transmitter and the k-th eavesdropper as
well as the l-th EH receiver. The constraint (53a) can be easily
relaxed as
(
1
t
− 1)σ2eI+HHe,k[( 1
t
− 1)W −Qs]He,k  0. (54)
This proof for the above LMI is omitted due to space limit,
readers are referred to [16] for more details. Since (54) is
obtained based on the assumption that rank(Qs) ≤ 1, we
substitute the constraints (53b) and (54) into the associated
constraints (27a) and (27c) in the Lagrange dual function (68),
where it easily verified that the optimal solution of Qs always
returns rank-one. Hence, the problem (32) still has rank-one
solution when the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers consist
of multiple antennas. Secondly, we provide a proof for the
optimal solution of (45) still returns rank-one for multiantenna
eavesdroppers and EH receivers. The channel uncertainties can
be modelled as
He,k=H¯e,k+Ee,k, ∀k, Hl=H¯l+El, ∀l,
where H¯e,k and H¯l are estimated channel, and Ee,k and El
are channel error matrices, which follow ‖Ee,k‖F ≤ εk and
‖El‖F ≤ εl. Thus, the constraints (53) can be relaxed by
incorporating with channel uncertainties as[
A1 A2
AH2 A3
]
 0,
[
B1 B2
BH2 B3
]
0, (55)
where A1 = [(t−1−1)σ2e−λe,k]I+H¯He,k[(t−1−1)W−Qs]H¯e,k,
A2 = H¯
H
e,k((t
−1−1)W−Qs), A3 = (t−1−1)W−Qs+
λe,k
ε2
k
I,
B1 = αlI+[I⊗(Qs+W)], B2 = [I⊗ (Qs+W)]h¯l, and B3 =
h¯Hl [I⊗(Qs+W)]h¯l−El−αlε
2
l . The first LMI of (55) is obtained
based on [16, Lemma 5], whereas the second LMI can be
relaxed by exploiting S-Procedure. Thus, these two constraints
are replaced the corresponding constraints in the dual function
(71) so that rank-one solution still can be obtained for the
robust secrecy rate maximization problem (45).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the simulation results to validate
our proposed algorithm. We consider the a MISO secrecy
system in the presence of three eavesdroppers and two EH
receivers. The legitimate transmitter is equipped with four
transmit antennas (i.e., NT = 4), whereas the others are
equipped with single antenna. All of channel coefficients (i.e.,
hs, he,k, and hl) have been generated as zero-mean circularly
symmetric independent and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables. The noise power are assumed to be 1 (i.e.,
σ2s = σ
2
e = 1). The transmit power (i.e., P ) is assumed to
be 20dB and all of the error bounds (i.e., εs, εe and εl) are
replaced by ε for convenience, which is set to be 0.05 unless
specified.
A. Secrecy Rate Optimization without AN
We first provide the simulation results for the secrecy rate
maximization problem for perfect and imperfect CSI. Fig. 1
shows that the achieved secrecy rate with different transmit
powers for robust schemes, non-robust schemes and perfect
CSI case, where it is easily observed that the achieved secrecy
rate increases with transmit power, and our proposed scheme
achieves the same performance with the scheme with SDP via
rank-relaxation. In addition, the robust scheme outperforms
the non-robust scheme in terms of achieved secrecy rate.
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Fig. 1: Secrecy rate with different transmit powers.
Then, the harvested power with different transmit powers and
different error bound ε are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. From
these two results, the harvested power increases with the
transmit power and decrease with the error bound (i.e., ε),
respectively.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Transmit power (dB)
H
ar
ve
st
ed
 e
ne
rg
y 
(dB
)
 
 
R = 1, ε
s
 = ε
e
 = εl = 0.1
R = 1,  ε
s
 = ε
e
 = εl = 0.2
Perfect CSI
Fig. 2: Harvested energy with different powers
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Error bound (ε)
H
ar
ve
st
ed
 e
ne
rg
y 
(dB
) 
 
 
P = 10dB, R = 1
P = 10dB, R = 2
P = 5dB, R = 1
P = 5dB, R = 2
Perfect CSI
Fig. 3: Harvested energy with different error bound ε
B. Secrecy Rate Optimization with AN
In this subsection, we provide the simulation results to
validate the proposed secrecy rate maximization problem for
joint optimization of transmit beamforming with AN. Fig.
4 shows that the achieved secrecy rate with different the
ratio of the harvested power with the transmit power (i.e.,
η = E
P
) based on perfect and imperfect CSI, where one-
dimensional line search based scheme and SCA algorithm with
or without AN are plotted, respectively. From this figure, the
achieved secrecy rate increase with transmit power, and both
schemes in perfect CSI has the same secrecy performance
with or without AN, whereas the SCA based scheme has
a little better performance than one-dimensional line search
based scheme at 0-25 dB, the SCA based scheme outperforms
slightly that with one-dimensional line search from 25 to
30 dB. Moreover, the transmit beamforming with AN has
a better performance than that without AN in terms of the
achieved secrecy rate. Next, the convergence performance of
the SCA based scheme is discussed in Fig. 5, which shows
the convergence of the SCA scheme, from this figure, we
can observe that the SCA algorithm converges slower as the
transmit power increases. Then, the achieved secrecy rate with
the ratio of the harvested power E to the transmit power
P is presented in Fig. 6, where we compare our proposed
schemes (i.e., one-dimensional line search and SCA) with
two-dimensional search and the scheme shown in [22]. It is
observed that one-dimensional line search scheme is closing
to the scheme in [22] and two-dimensional search scheme.
In addition, the SCA based scheme outperforms these three
schemes. At last, we provide the simulation result to show
the proportion of the AN power Tr(W) in the total transmit
power (P ) with different signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which
can be replaced by P due to the noise power equals to 1. One
can observe that this proportion increase first and then has
a decline after approximately 15 dB, and the robust scheme
without the EH receivers has a lower proportion of the AN
lower SNR regime. In addition, the scheme in [22] has a larger
proportion than our both proposed schemes.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the secrecy rate optimization
problems for a MISO secrecy channel for SWIPT in presence
of multiple eavesdroppers and EH receivers. We first proposed
a novel reformulation by using Nemiroski lemma to optimize
the transmit beamforming to circumvent rank-relaxation based
on perfect CSI and imprefect CSI. Then, jointly optimization
for transmit beamforming with AN are considered in the
secrecy rate maximization problem based on both perfect
CSI and imperfect CSI. We reformulated this optimization
problem by using one-dimensional line search method and
SCA algorithm, respectively. Furthermore, we provide the
tightness analysis for this optimization problem, which can
show the optimal solution of this secrecy rate maximization
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problem exactly returns rank-one. Simulation results have been
provided to validate the performance of our proposed schemes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove Lemma 1, we first rewrite the secrecy rate
constraint in (6) as
1
σ2s
|wHhs|2≥
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
(56)
Then, the following lemma is required to convert the above
constraint into a SDP:
Lemma 3: (Schur complement) [27]: Let X is complex
hermitian matrix,
X=XH=
[
A B
BH C
]
(57)
Thus, S = C−BHA−1B is the Schur complement of A in
X, and the following statements hold:
• X ≻ 0, if and only if A ≻ 0 and S ≻ 0.
• if A ≻ 0 then X ≻ 0 if and only if S ≻ 0.
By exploiting the Schur complement, (56) can be reformulated
as 

1
σs
wHhsI
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
1
σs
wHhs

  0, (58)
In addition, we consider the reformulation of the EH con-
straint in (6). In order to express this constraint clearly, we
introduce two variables (i.e., xl ∈ R and yl ∈ R) such that
this constraint can be equivalently modified as
x
2
l + y
2
l ≥ E, (59a)
xl = ℜ{wHhl}, yl = ℑ{wHhl}, ∀l. (59b)
The constraint (59b) is convex (linear), whereas (59a) is
not still convex, thus, first-order Taylor approximation is
considered to obtain the desired upper bound.
Setting ul = [xl yl]T , thus, x2l + y2l = uTl ul. u
(n)
l is n-th
iteration of the vector ul. Thus, (59a) can be approximated as
u
T
l ul ≈ ‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)], (60)
where i denotes the i-th element of the vector ul.
This completes Lemma 1. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The second constraint in (11) can be rewritten as
S
′
k=


f (n)(t2)I
[
2
R
2
σe
wH(h¯e,k+ee,k)
(2R−1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wH(h¯e,k+ee,k)
(2R−1) 12
]H
f (n)(t2)

0,
(61)
Lemma 4: (Nemirovski lemma) [29]: For a given set of
matrices A = AH , B and C, the following linear matrix
inequality is satisfied:
A  BXC+CHXHB, ‖X‖ ≤ t, (62)
if and only if there exist non-negative real numbers a such
that [
A− aCHC −tBH
−tB aI
]
 0. (63)
By exploiting Nemirovski lemma, the constraint in (61) is
written as
Sk

 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0

 ee,k [ 0 −1 ]+
[
0
−1
]
e
H
e,k
[
2
R
2
σe
w 0 0
]
, (64)
where
Sk =


f (n)(t2)I
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R−1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R−1) 12
]H
f (n)(t2)

 (65)
Thus, the robust secrecy rate constraint can be reformulated
as
S¯k=


Sk−λk
[
0 −1 ] [ 0−1
]
−εe,k

 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0


−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
λkI

0,∀k. (66)
This completes Lemma 2. 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, it is assumed that ϕ1 and ϕ2
are optimal values of (16) and (18), respectively. We first show
(18) can obtain the optimal value of (16) (i.e., ϕ2 ≥ ϕ1). It
easily verified that the following equality holds:
ϕ1 = f(τ
∗). (67)
On the other hand, ϕ2 = maxτ≥0 f(τ) ≥ f(τ∗), thus, ϕ2 ≥
ϕ1. Secondly, in order to show that (16) achieve the optimal
value of (18) (i.e., ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2). Here, we assume that τ† is the
optimal value of (18), and w† is the optimal solution of (17)
with τ = τ†. It can be easily observed from (16a), (17a), and
(17b) that w† is a feasible solution of (16), thus, ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2.
We combine these two parts, it includes ϕ1 = ϕ2.
This completes Theorem 1. 
D. Proof of Theorem 2
The Lagrange function of (36) can be written as
L(Qs,Y,Z, λ, µ, ηi, νl, τk)=Tr(Qs)
−λ
[
Tr[hshHs (Qs−f(t)W)]−σ2sf(t)
]
+µ
[
Tr(Qs+W)−P
]
+
NT∑
i=1
ηi
[
Tr[Ai(Qs+W)]−pi
]
−
L∑
l=1
νl
[
Tr[hlhHl (Qs+W)]
−El
]
+
K∑
k=1
τk
[
Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs−(t−1)W)]−(t− 1)σ2e
]
−Tr(YQs)−Tr(ZW), (68)
where Y, Z, λ, µ, ηi, νl, τk denote the dual variables of
Qs, W, (35), (27b), (27c), and (31), respectively. Then, we
consider the following related KKT conditions:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0,⇒ Y=I−λhshHs +µI+
NT∑
i=1
ηiAi−
L∑
l=1
νlhlh
H
l
+
K∑
k=1
τkhe,kh
H
e,k, (69a)
∂L
∂W
= 0,⇒ Z=λf(t)hshHs +µI+
NT∑
i=1
ηiAi−
L∑
l=1
νlhlh
H
l
−
K∑
k=1
τk(t− 1)he,khHe,k, (69b)
QsY = 0,Z  0, λ ≥ 0, ∀i, l, k. (69c)
By subtracting (69b) from (69a), we have
Y − Z = I− λ(1 + f(t))hshHs +
K∑
k=1
τkthe,kh
H
e,k,
⇒ Y = A− λ(1 + f(t))hshHs , (70)
where A = I + Z+
∑K
k=1 τkthe,kh
H
e,k. From (70), one can
easily observe that A is positive definite, and rank(A) = NT ,
whereas rank(Y) = NT or NT − 1. However, Qs = 0 when
rank(Y) = NT due to the first condition in (72c), which
violates Rs − Re,k > 0. In addition, it is easily verified that
λ > 0 and f(t) > 0. Thus, rank(Y) = NT − 1 always holds,
which implies Qs lies in the null space of Y from (72c), thus
rank(Qs) = 1.
This completes Theorem 2. 
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We first consider the dual function of the problem (48),
L(Qs,W,Y,Z, λ, γi,Ts,Te,k,Tl)=Tr(Qs)−Tr(YQs)
−Tr(ZW) + λ[Tr(Qs+W)−P ]+
NT∑
i=1
γi
[
Tr[A¯i(Qs+W)]
+εi‖Qs +W‖F−pi
]
−Tr(TsA1)−Tr[TsHHs (Qs−f(t)W)Hs]
−
K∑
k=1
Tr(Te,kBk)+
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Te,kH
H
e,k[Qs−(t−1−1)W]He,k
]
−
L∑
l=1
Tr(TlCl)−
L∑
l=1
Tr[TlHHl (Qs+W)Hl], (71)
where Y ∈ HNT+ , Z ∈ H
NT
+ , λ ∈ R+, γi ∈ R+, Ts ∈ H
NT
+ ,
Te,k ∈ H
NT
+ and Tl ∈ H
NT
+ are dual variables of Qs, W,(45a), (45c) and (45b), respectively, in addition,
A1=
[
βsI 0
0H −f(t)σ2s−βsε2s
]
, Hs=
[
INT h¯s
]
,
Bk=
[
λe,kI 0
0H (t−1−1)σ2e−λe,kε2e
]
, He,k=
[
INT h¯e,k
]
,
Cl=
[
αlI 0
0H −El−αlε2l
]
, Hl=
[
INT h¯l
]
.
The related KKT conditions are considered as follows:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0,⇒ Y=I+λI+
NT∑
i=1
γi[A¯i+εi‖Qs+W‖−1F I]
−HsTsHHs +
K∑
k=1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k−
L∑
l=1
HlTlH
H
l , (72a)
∂L
∂W
= 0,⇒Z=λI+
NT∑
i=1
γi[A¯i+εi‖Qs+W‖−1F I]+f(t)HsTsHHs
−
K∑
k=1
(t−1−1)He,kTe,kHHe,k−
L∑
l=1
HlTlH
H
l , (72b)
QsY = 0,Z0, ∀i, k, l, (72c)
[A1 +H
H
s (Qs − f(t)W)Hs]Ts = 0. (72d)
By subtracting (72b) from (72a), we have
Y−Z=I−[1+f(t)]HsTsHHs +
K∑
k=1
t
−1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k,
⇒ Y+[1+f(t)]HsTsHHs =I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t
−1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k,
(73)
We premultiply (73) by Qs,
Qs
(
I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t
−1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k
)
=[1+f(t)]QsHsTsH
H
s ,
(74)
The following rank relation holds:
rank(Qs) = rank
[
Qs
(
I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t
−1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k
)]
= rank(QsHsTsHHs )
≤ min{rank(HsTsHHs ), rank(Qs)} (75)
Based on the above rank relation, we need to show
rank(HsTsHHs ) ≤ 1 if we claim rank(Qs) ≤ 1, thus, we
consider the following two facts:[
INT 0
]
H
H
s =INT ,[
INT 0
]
A1=βs
(
Hs−
[
0NT h¯s
])
.
Premultiplying
[
INT 0
]
and postmultiplying HHs by (72d),
respectively, we have
βs
(
Hs−
[
0NT h¯s
])
TsH
H
s +[Qs−f(t)W]HsTsHHs =0,
⇒
(
βsI+[Qs−f(t)W]
)
HsTsH
H
s =βs
[
0NT h¯s
]
TsH
H
s .(76)
Lemma 5: If a block hermitian matrix P=
[
P1 P2
P3 P4
]
0,
then the main diagonal matrices P1 and P4 are always PSD
matrices [30].
Now, we can claim βsI+[Qs−f(t)W]0 and is nonsingular,
thus pre(post)multiplying by a nonsingular matrix will not
change the matrix rank. Thus, the following rank relation
holds:
rank(HsTsHHs ) = rank
([
0NT h¯s
]
TsH
H
s
)
≤ rank
([
0NT h¯s
])≤1. (77)
This completes Theorem 3. 
REFERENCES
[1] E. Hossain, M. Rasti, H. Tabassum, and A. Abdelnasser, “Evolution
toward 5G multi-tier cellular wireless networks: An interference man-
agement perspective,” IEEE, Wireless Commun., vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 118–
127, Jun. 2014.
[2] V. Raghunathan, S. Ganeriwal, and M. Srivastava, “Emerging techniques
for long lived wireless sensor networks,” IEEE, Commun. Mag., vol. 44,
no. 4, pp. 108–114, Apr. 2006.
[3] R. Zhang and C. K. Ho, “MIMO broadcasting for simultaneous wire-
less information and power transfer,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 12, pp. 1989–2001, May 2013.
[4] L. Varshney, “Transporting information and energy simultaneously,” in
Proc. 2008 IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, pp. 1612–1616, July, 2008.
[5] P. Grover and A. Sahai, “Shannon meets tesla: Wireless information and
power transfer,” in Proc. 2010 IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, pp. 2363–
2367, June, 2010.
[6] Y. Liang, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure communication over fading
channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2470–2492,
Jun. 2008.
[7] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, Mar. 2010.
[8] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic´, and H. V. Poor, “Interference assisted
secret communication,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 57, no. 5,
pp. 3153–3167, May 2011.
[9] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[10] Q. Li and W.-K. Ma, “Optimal and robust transmit designs for MISO
channel secrecy by semidefinite programming,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 59, no. 8, pp. 3799–3812, Aug. 2011.
[11] C. Jeong and I.-M. Kim, “Optimal power allocation for secure mul-
ticarrier relay systems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 11,
pp. 5428–5442, Nov. 2011.
[12] C. Jeong, I.-M. Kim, and D. I. Kim, “Joint secure beamforming design
at the source and the relay for an amplify-and-forward MIMO untrusted
relay system,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 310–325,
Jan. 2012.
[13] G. Zheng, L.-C. Choo, and K.-K. Wong, “Optimal cooperative jamming
to enhance physical layer security using relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1317–1322, Mar. 2011.
[14] J. Huang and A. Swindlehurst, “Cooperative jamming for secure com-
munications in MIMO relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4871–4884, Oct. 2011.
[15] Z. Chu, K. Cumanan, Z. Ding, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Secrecy
rate optimizations for a MIMO secrecy channel with a cooperative
jammer,” to appear in IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technol., 2014.
[16] Q. Li and W.-K. Ma, “Spatially selective artificial-noise aided transmit
optimization for MISO multi-eves secrecy rate maximization,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 2704–2717, May 2013.
[17] L. Liu, R. Zhang, and K.-C. Chua, “Secrecy wireless information and
power transfer with MISO beamforming,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 1850–1863, Apr. 2014.
[18] M. Khandaker and K. Wong, “Masked beamforming in the presence of
energy-harvesting eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 10, pp. 40–54, Jan 2015.
[19] Z. Chu, K. Cumanan, M. Xu, and Z. Ding, “Robust secrecy rate
optimisations for multiuser multiple-input-single-output channel with
device-to-device communications,” to appear in IET Commun., 2015.
[20] Q. Li, W.-K. Ma, and A.-C. So, “Robust artificial noise-aided transmit
optimization for achieving secrecy and energy harvesting,” in Proc. 2014
IEEE, ICASSP, pp. 1596–1600, May 2014.
[21] R. Feng, Q. Li, Q. Zhang, and J. Qin, “Robust secure transmission in
MISO simultaneous wireless information and power transfer system,”
IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technol., vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 400–405, Jan. 2015.
[22] M. Tian, X. Huang, Q. Zhang, and J. Qin, “Robust AN-Aided secure
transmission scheme in MISO channels with simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer,” IEEE, Signal Process. Lett., vol. 22,
no. 6, pp. 723–727, Jun. 2015.
[23] H. Xing, Z. Chu, Z. Ding, and A. Nallanathan, “Harvest-and-
jam:improving security for wireless energy harvesting cooperative net-
works,” in to appear in IEEE GLOBECOM, Dec. 2014.
[24] Z. Ding, C. Zhong, D. W. K. Ng, M. Peng, H. A. Suraweera, R. Schober,
and H. V. Poor, “Application of smart antenna technologies in simul-
taneous wireless information and power transfer,” to appear in IEEE
Commun. Mag., 2014. http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.1712.
[25] L. Tran, M. Hanif, A. Tolli, and M. Juntti, “Fast converging algorithm
for weighted sum rate maximization in multicell MISO downlink,”
IEEE, Signal Process. Lett., vol. 19, no. 12, pp. 872–875, Dec. 2012.
[26] L.-N. Tran, M. Hanif, and M. Juntti, “A conic quadratic programming
approach to physical layer multicasting for large-scale antenna arrays,”
IEEE, Signal Process. Lett., vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 114–117, Jan. 2014.
[27] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[28] W.-C. Li, T.-H. Chang, C. Lin, and C.-Y. Chi, “Coordinated beam-
forming for multiuser MISO interference channel under rate outage
constraints,” IEEE Trans, Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 1087–1103,
Mar. 2013.
[29] Y. Eldar, A. Ben-Tal, and A. Nemirovski, “Robust mean-squared error
estimation in the presence of model uncertainties,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 168–181, Jan. 2005.
[30] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
